Introduction
-2 -cross-border pairs relative to the within-country pairs. One difficulty with this approach, however, is that significant differences in the distribution of within-country prices across countries confounds the border effect. We call this the country heterogeneity effect. A perceived advantage of the ER border coefficient was that it provided a model-free, easy-to-interpret summary statistic of the magnitude of international frictions. We show that when there is country heterogeneity, however, the regression is under-identified; it is impossible to separate the border from the effect of trading with a country with a different distribution of prices. In other words, a typical estimate of the border coefficients reflects the combined effect of the border and the effect of cross-county heterogeneity on trade prices.
The following example illustrates the pitfalls of estimating border equations. Consider a dataset with price data from four cities: Seattle, Chicago, Vancouver and Calgary. Suppose that, after conditioning on distance and adjusting for the exchange rate, the price of some good k in Vancouver and Calgary is identical, but the price of the good is quite different in Seattle and is yet more different in Chicago. If one were to test whether the pair-wise price differentials of intra-country prices (in this example Vancouver-Calgary and Chicago-Seattle) were statistically significantly different from the cross-border prices (Vancouver-Chicago, Vancouver-Seattle, Calgary-Seattle and Calgary-Chicago) one would find that there are wider deviations from parity in the cross-border pairs than in the sample of within-country pairs. However, that difference would be driven by the disparate behavior of prices in the US (Seattle and Chicago). It would have nothing to do with the friction of crossing a border. One could, of course, include city dummies to pick up the dispersion of prices across U.S. cities. However, as we will show below, when the dispersion across cities is larger in one country relative to the other, it becomes impossible to separate the cross-country effect from the border. This example is not just a hypothetical pathology. Our statistical analysis will show that this example characterizes the USCanada data. The variance across cities within the U.S. is much greater than the variance across cities within Canada. Given country heterogeneity, a border regression based on comparing prices in the U.S. and Canada will produce a U.S./Canada border effect driven by the high variance within the U.S.
The structure of this comment is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the econometric specification that is conventionally used to estimate the border effect using U.S./Canada price data analyzed in previous studies and briefly replicate the results reported in ER. In section 3, we discuss potential identification problems (specifically, the country heterogeneity effect) in using the standard econometric specification to estimate the border effect. In Section 4, we show the -3 -sensitivity of the border effect to the presence of cross-country heterogeneity. We conclude in Section 5. q into a single number. To provide a sense of how wide the border is, ER use the distance equivalent of the border (that is, the border effect):
Estimation and Identification of the Border Effect
ER and the subsequent literature use the standard deviation of changes in the real exchange rate as the dependent variable in (1). Taking differences in the real exchange rate is appropriate for price indices and implies that one is testing relative rather than absolute PPP.
Differencing the data also helps reduce the persistence of the real exchange rate. We follow the literature and use specification (1) with the standard deviation of changes in the real exchange rate to estimate the border effect.
-4 - Because distance is an independent variable in the border effect regressions, we also illustrate the distribution of In the first column of Table 3 in ER).
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-5 -ER argue that the large border effect cannot be completely explained by the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. They find that the border effect remains large when price differentials are measured by the relative exchange rate measured as ( )
is the price of good k in city i at time t, P it is the Consumer Price Index for city i at time t (descriptive statistics are in Table 1 ). We reproduce their large estimate of the border effect for Table 2 : the border is equivalent to 845 km.
Identification of the border effect
The basic intuition behind the specification of (1) is that the border coefficient captures deviations from the law of one price in international prices relative to the benchmark of deviations from the law of one price in intra-country prices. The problem arises, however, when there are substantial cross-country differences in the deviation from the law of one price within countries. When this happens, there is no clear benchmark from which to assess the impact of trading across the border relative to trading with countries with different distributions of prices.
For concreteness, suppose that the two countries are Canada and the U.S. and cities are the relevant geographical units. The border effect in (1) measures how much a ceteris paribus transition from an intra-national city pair (UU or CC) to an international city pair (UC) raises the average volatility of the price differential. Intuitively, the border effect should reflect factors that are specific to UC pairs, and should not include factors that stem from differences between UU and CC pairs. To put this in the language of the program evaluation/treatment effects literature, the border coefficient should pick up the effect associated with the treatment of crossing the border. If, in the absence of the border treatment, city-pairs differ for other (non-border related)
reasons, one should condition on this heterogeneity to isolate the effect of the treatment. The treatment effect literature is replete with examples of how ignoring such heterogeneity can bias the estimate of the treatment effect (see Smith (2004) for a discussion and examples).
We return to the ER specification to show how the dispersion for each city pair is decomposed into a city and country contribution. To simplify exposition, we omit for now the error term and controls for distance and commodities. For all pairs, the volatility of the real exchange rate is described by:
where UC, UU, CC are dummy variables for UC, UU, and CC city pairs, D s is a city dummy equal to one if s = i or s = j and zero otherwise and N is the number of cities. Equation (3) shows that the volatility of prices can be orthoganalized into four components: , , U C β γ γ and the city dummies. The coefficient U γ reflects institutional and structural features of the data specific to cities in the United States, C γ reflects institutional and structural features of the data specific to cities in Canada, the city dummies reflect variation that is city-specific and not captured in the country effects, and β reflects the variation specific to crossing the border.
Without loss of generality, suppose that 1,…,k cities are in Canada. The average volatility for types of city pairs is then given by:
US-Canada:
US-US: 2
Canada-Canada: 2 
Equations (7) and (8) make clear that the country-specific component of price variation shows up in two places, in the cross-border effect and in the city effects. This is why city dummies alone cannot correct for country variation.
ER proceed by substituting (7) and (8) into (3), effectively eliminating the country dummies CC ij and UU ij so that:
The country heterogeneity effect is now absorbed partially in the city-fixed effects but also appears in the border coefficient. Under this specification the coefficients on the border dummy (the term in the first bracket) measures the increase in cross-border volatility relative to the average volatility of the intra-country pairs.
Why isn't the average of intra-country volatility a good benchmark for measuring the price impact of crossing the border? Take the case where C U γ γ < , i.e. prices within Canada have very little dispersion relative to prices within the U.S. As shown in the first row of Table 1 , the standard deviation of the real exchange rate of Canadian city pairs is in fact about half the volatility of that for US city pairs, and the dispersion of cross-border pairs is similar to that of US city pairs. 8 Using the ER specification, the estimated border coefficient -relative to the twocountry average of intra-national volatilities -is large and positive, even when from the U.S.
perspective crossing the border has almost no impact on the variance of the real exchange rate.
To understand what is going on, suppose one were to ignore the information on intra-Canadian prices, and simply compare US-US pairs with cross-border pairs. In this case, the border coefficient would be small. However, one cannot tell whether the small border coefficient means that crossing the border has a minimal impact on volatility, or whether it reflects the fact that Americans are trading with Canadian city partners that have less dispersed prices. From the perspective of Canadians, crossing the border dramatically increases the variance of the real exchange rate. If one were to repeat the exercise and ignore the intra-US data, the estimated border coefficient based on CC and UC pairs would be extremely large. However, one does not know whether the large coefficient occurs because crossing the border actually leads to greater price dispersion, or whether this is because Canadians are trading with US cities that have more disparate prices. The point is that one needs information about price variability in each country, as well as guidance from economic theory, in order to assign the appropriate weight to each country's price variability to construct the correct benchmark.
In a companion paper (Gorodnichenko and Tesar 2007) , we show that it is next to impossible to identify the true border using only price data even in a standard trade model.
-8 -Numerical simulations in which there is no border friction but there is cross-country heterogeneity suggest that the best benchmark based only on price data could put all weight on the country with the smallest border effect. And even this highly conservative estimate can overstate the magnitude of the border effect. In addition, within-country variation itself may be affected by the imposition of a border further compromising within-country variation as a benchmark for the border. That is, within-country price dispersion may serve as a poor benchmark because price dispersion between and within countries is determined simultaneously in general equilibrium and therefore one can grossly overstate or understate the size of the border friction because of endogenous amplification or attenuation effects. Hence, in the absence of a structural model that identifies particular control variables, such as factors affecting markups, transportation, volume of trade flows and production costs, or a controlled experiment, in which a country moves from autarky to trade, we do not know if the arithmetic average, or any other combination of within-country variances, is the appropriate benchmark for evaluating the effect of the border.
We propose an alternative decomposition into country and city effects. To be clear, the alternative decomposition does not solve the weighting problem -rather it reveals the magnitude of the cross-country heterogeneity problem by explicitly estimating the country dummies. One can rearrange terms in (3) as follows:
where ˆs s U α α α = − if s is a US city (i.e., deviation of the city effect from the national mean), are not collinear with other right-hand side variables. 9 Since city effects reflect city specific deviation from national characteristics, the average city effect is normalized to zero in each country.
Because rearrangement in (10) and (9) is purely algebraic, (10) and (9) have the same explanatory power (e.g., the same R 2 ) and one can back out coefficients in specification (10) -9 -from specification (9) and vice versa. 10 The main advantage of specification (10) is that b UC , b UU , and b CC -the coefficients on UC, UU and CC-now measure the average volatility for USCanada, US-US, and Canada-Canada city pairs so that the estimated coefficients are directly related to the objects of interest in equations (4) give meaningful estimates of increases in the volatility of the real exchange rate when one goes from an intra-national city pair to an international city pair. To estimate (11), the researcher needs to augment (1) with the CC dummy as follows:
where Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs, city-specific effects are constrained as in (10) 
Re-examination of the Border Effect Estimates
The effect of within-country differences (the country heterogeneity effect) on the estimated border can be seen by adding the CC dummy to the regression (1) using the identification strategy in equation (10). By pooling UU and CC pairs, the researcher estimates a border effect that is mixed with country heterogeneity. To demonstrate how important this fact is in estimates of the border effect, we estimate (11) and report the results in the second column. We find that the key coefficient 2 β in (1) is sensitive to the inclusion of the CC dummy. In particular, the coefficient 2 β for the pooled regression remains statistically significant but drops from 12.026 to 4.148 thus making the "border" coefficient, here estimated from the US perspective, fall from 10 One can also rearrange (3) so that the right-hand side variables are border dummy, country and city dummies. This rearrangement yields a specification similar to (9).
-10 -71,438 km to 47 km. By the same token, one can extract a "border" effect of 108 million km for Canada.
The finding that the border coefficients are so dramatically different for Canada and the US is a direct consequence of the large differences in σ UU and σ CC -the within-country deviations from the law of one price. The "border" coefficient for the US is small because USCanada price differentials have about the same dispersion as US-US price differentials. But from this data alone it is impossible to tell whether this is because the border itself is unimportant, or because cross border trade reflects transactions with Canadian cities that happen to exhibit very little cross-city price dispersion. Conversely, the very large border coefficient for Canada could be because crossing the border is costly, or because Canadians are trading with US cities that exhibit more price dispersion than do Canadian cities. Because we do not know how to combine within-country price distributions to obtain a clean benchmark for isolating the border effect, the strongest, and not very informative, statement we can make is that the point estimate of the border effect is somewhere between 47 kilometers and 108 million kilometers.
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As we show in Section 3, under the ER specification differences in the volatility of real exchange rate for UU and CC pairs are absorbed by the city dummies. Inspection of coefficients on the city dummies in Table 4 shows the relationship between country and city effects.
Canadian cities (the shaded rows) are systematically negative while the coefficients on city dummies for U.S. cities are systematically positive. Once we control for the differences across countries (specification (11); Table 4 , column 2), the volatility of UC and CC pairs is measured by the coefficient on the Border and CC dummy and the coefficients on city dummies do not have any pattern. We should note that it is not possible to distinguish on econometric grounds between the ER specification and the one we propose because they are just rearrangements of one another. However, we believe that given the nature of the country-specific variation in the data our specification is the most sensible approach. At a minimum, our results suggest that the border coefficient is highly sensitive to the assumptions one makes about the source of variation and the relevant benchmark for measuring the border effect.
We reach the same conclusion for the relative exchange rate k ijt RER : ER's findings for the relative exchange rate are also affected by the country heterogeneity effect. Indeed, when the CC 11 There are large differences across goods in terms of the magnitude of the deviations from the law of one price and the ratios of σ UC to σ UU and σ CC . The addition of a country dummy changes the estimated border coefficients dramatically for 11 of the 14 goods. In nine of those cases, the "border" from the Canadian perspective is larger than from the US perspective. In two cases the US "border" appears larger. In the three cases where the country dummy had no effect, the border coefficient is estimated to be zero under either the ER specification or ours.
-11 -dummy is included (column 2, Table 3 ), the estimate of the border effect shrinks from 845 km to less than zero from the US perspective and increases to 2.3 million km from the Canadian perspective. Again, the most precise statement one can make is that the border is somewhere between 0 and 2.3 million km.
Concluding Remarks
The border effects estimated from price data are often implausibly large. Moreover, significant border effects are found where they should not be found. We take these facts as indication that the commonly applied methodology makes assumptions that do not hold in the data. We show that when there is country heterogeneity in prices, there is no clear benchmark from which to gauge the effect of the border. In effect, the standard regression used to estimate border effects is under-identified; it is impossible to separate the border from the effect of trading with a country with a different distribution of prices. We return to the data studied by Engel and Rogers and show that in the U.S.-Canada sample, adjusting for cross-country heterogeneity produces two quasi-border coefficients: one of 47 km, from the US perspective, and one of over 108 million km from the Canadian perspective. However, neither coefficient is a true estimate of the border frictions as both coefficients reflect the combined effect of the border and the effect of crosscounty heterogeneity on trade prices. When within-country heterogeneity in prices is significant, as it is in the case of the United States and Canada, the border coefficient that emerges from tests comparing within-country prices to cross-border prices tells us little about actual border effects.
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Note: Distance-adjusted dispersion is computed as the residual in the regression of dispersion on log distance between cities. Because the distance-adjusted dispersion is measured as a residual, it may take negative values. Whiskers extend from the box to the upper and lower adjacent values and are capped with an adjacent line. Adjacent values are calculated utilizing the interquartile range (IQR). The upper adjacent value is the largest data value that is less than or equal to the third quartile plus 1.5 X IQR and the lower adjacent value is the smallest data value that is greater than or equal to the first quartile minus 1.5 times IQR. Values exceeding the upper and lower adjacent values (outside values) are not presented.
-14 - -15 - Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. City and good category dummies are included but not reported.
-16 - Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. City and good category dummies are included but not reported.
-17 - Note: Dependent variable is the standard deviation of changes in the real exchange rate, σ(Δ 2 q ijt k ). CC is the dummy variable for Canada-Canada city pairs, Border is the dummy variable for US-Canada pairs (UC dummy). Omitted category is US-US city pairs. Coefficients are multiplied by 1000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to column 1 in Table 2 and column 1 in Table 3 respectively. See the note for Table 2 and the text for further details.
